Hempel’s Dilemma: Scientific Explanation and The Challenge to Physicalism

Remigius Achinike  Obah; Hilary Anayochukwu  Eke

doi:10.51699/cajlpc.v6i4.1348

Authors

Remigius Achinike Obah Department of Philosophy, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria
Hilary Anayochukwu Eke Department of Philosophy, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51699/cajlpc.v6i4.1348

Keywords:

Hempel's Dilemma, Physicalism, Scientific Explanation, Mind-Body Problem, Physics

Abstract

Hempel’s Dilemma posits that the thesis of physicalism is either false or empty. This presents a significant challenge to the definition of physicalism, which asserts that everything is ultimately physical in nature. Originally articulated by Carl Gustav Hempel, the dilemma critiques how physicalism can be coherently defined in light of the evolving nature of physics. This paper explores the intricate relationship between scientific explanation, physical theories, and Hempel's Dilemma. Thus, the article examines how explanatory frameworks in physical science are constrained and shaped by the structure and content of physical theories, given the challenge to physicalism wrought by the weighty sledgehammer of the dilemma. The tension between current and ideal physics raises important questions about the adequacy of scientific explanation and the metaphysical commitments of physicalist worldviews. The article provides a critical discussion of the role of explanation in both contemporary and theoretical physics, while also assessing the implications for broader metaphysical and epistemological debates. The dilemma is explored in the light of recent scholarship by critically analyzing various responses to Hempel's Dilemma, examining the implications for reductionism, emergentism, and the mind-body problem, and the broader philosophical consequences for scientific explanation and metaphysical commitment. This study concludes that philosophical flexibility is necessary in addressing the dynamic nature of scientific progress and suggests a pluralistic approach to these discussions.

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