

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Article

Chinese-European Competition over African Energy Sources

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Abstract: The competition between China and Europe for access to African energy resources has significant implications for global energy security and geopolitical dynamics. This rivalry not only affects bilateral relations but also shapes the strategic landscape in Africa, where nations are increasingly finding themselves as pawns in a larger geopolitical game. As nations like China invest heavily in infrastructure and energy projects, European countries are compelled to reassess their own strategies to secure sustainable energy supplies. This dynamic has led to a heightened competition between these two global powers, each seeking to secure their foothold in the resource-rich continent. The implications of this rivalry are profound, affecting not only bilateral relations but also the geopolitical landscape of Africa itself. This competition has led to increased investments and infrastructure development in the region, as both powers vie for strategic advantages. Furthermore, the pursuit of energy resources has resulted in complex partnerships and rivalries among African nations themselves. This dynamic has further complicated the geopolitical landscape, as external powers like China and Europe seek to secure their interests in the region. As these nations vie for influence, African countries are often caught in a balancing act, negotiating terms that seek to maximize their benefits while navigating the potential repercussions of foreign intervention.

Keywords: Energy, Competition, Africa, China, Europe, Resources, Geopolitics

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1. Introduction

The last decade has been characterized by the spectacular rise of the People's Republic of China. The last four years have seen Beijing establish itself as the European Union's leading commercial partner. The success of its economic stimulus package has allowed China to restore its growth rate and overtake the International Monetary Fund's output forecasts. Additionally, the EU's unfolding sovereign debt crisis has inspired Chinese interests to diversify their FX holdings into African government bonds and national infrastructure projects [1].

Recently, it has been described that Somalia, Libya, and Sudan are battlegrounds of European and Chinese interests. It has been recalled that EU officers' positions are behind the "3M", ZTE, and Huawei intrusion cases in measurement satellite projects. "The government located in Kyiv should hence be extremely wary of its key defense and telecommunications infrastructures," has been added [2], [3].

Twice the major diplomatic visits to Sub-Saharan Africa under Xi Jinping, power keeps him parallel to Angola and South Africa focusing on absorbing coal industrials and brownfields expansion strategies. Italy, DR Congo, and Kenya discussed the Chinese One Belt One Road project and dairy production development [4]. Moreover, the European

Council has considered the Silk Road Challenge blaze as one of the largest of the realm. Behind the ASEAN satellite program, the Korean peninsularity becomes to bother also Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh far-off relations. Benefit is foreseen around Arabia and Eurasia by diverging a new branch of the Silk Road. This supposed policy move could boost the development of the Mediterranean ports and establish a potential connection between the Malacca Straits and Indonesian islands [5].

In his last meeting with the Italian PM, it was unveiled the future EU investment plan for the Southeast Asia project, to be coordinated with the Korean strategy promoting the Gulf of Hammamet enlargement. A tier of the councilors for foreign investments of the Central Mediterranean Republic will hence be appointed by resolving divergences on the Neapolitan confluence. The United Kingdom shall officially props the ECSO project during negotiations at Delhi. Early September, it was revealed the Czech perpetual control of the Dilbar Oilfields to the tune of 3,05 billions euro (only 2 billions exceeding asset valuation), in keeping with the first semester losses. The deal has been presented as an "investiture of the European common interests".

2. Materials and Methods

Research Problem

The research problem lies in the increasing competition between China and the European Union over energy resources in Africa, as both powers seek to ensure their energy security through investment and control of strategic resources on the African continent. This competition raises questions about its repercussions on African countries, on the one hand, and on international balances of power, on the other, especially in light of its accompanying economic and geopolitical dimensions.

Research Importance

a. It highlights a strategic issue affecting global energy security.
b. It demonstrates Africa's role as a key axis in the international energy equation.
c. It illustrates the repercussions of the Sino-European competition on the economies of African countries.
d. It helps decision-makers understand the nature of the new international balances of power in light of the struggle for influence.
e. It adds cognitive value to the Arab library in the field of international relations and energy studies.

Research Objectives

a. To analyze the motives of China and the European Union in competing over African energy resources.
b. To study the tools and mechanisms used by each party to achieve energy influence in Africa.
c. To reveal the impact of this competition on African countries, both economically and politically.
d. Anticipating the repercussions of the Sino-European conflict on the international order and global energy security.
e. Proposing proposals for dealing with this competition in a manner that serves the interests of African countries.

Research Hypothesis

The research is based on the basic premise that:

"The Sino-European competition over energy resources in Africa is not limited to the economic dimension alone, but extends to geopolitical and strategic dimensions that impact Africa's position in the international order and reshape the global balance of power."

Overview of African Energy Resources

The African continent possesses a generous endowment of natural resources such as hydrocarbons, precious metals, and timber. Energy resources come in the form of oil, coal, and uranium. For the past several decades, energy, primarily oil and gas, has garnered the most attention. Access to strategic resources has driven both national policy and international conflict and cooperation. In the post-Cold War era, the US has spearheaded a series of strategies to open the economies of developing countries to further penetration by Western capital. China has risen to challenge this dominance by securing, rather than enforcing, resource deals. Africa has been evenly split between these two economic powerhouses. The militarisation of US foreign policy could undermine the western advantages in Africa. Shia Islam, prevalent in Iran, Iraq, and parts of eastern Africa, poses a challenge to Western regional dominance. The crude and faltering construction of the US Africa Command is one such example.

Africa is richly endowed with energy resources, which due to political instability, poor infrastructure, and lack of investment, remain mostly untapped and underdeveloped. France and the US have consistently exerted military influence in Mauritania and the Gulf of Guinea, respectively. OPEC, dominated by Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula, threatens US and European economic security. In return, proxy wars engender domestic political stability. Ongoing developments in southern Sudan and Somalia indicate this strategy is far from exhausted. The Sudanese civil war was initially fueled by a proxy power struggle, neither of which had interest in championing claims to sovereignty by the non-Muslim south. China was in a position to broker the 2005 peace deal between the South and Khartoum. South African peacekeepers, insulated from the birth of the post-Cold War UN forces in places like Rwanda, were pivotal in ending that state's 27-year civil war.

Oil Reserves

Oil and gas are considered today's most strategic commodities in the world because all nations are highly dependent on these resources, both developed and developing. The Chinese economy is currently the fourth biggest trading country in the world, and is the biggest in regard to Africa. This is an increasingly closed competition that is being hiked in developing countries. These commodities are considered as strategic. In this regard, the objective of this part is to analyze the competition between China and Europe over African energy sources to significantly contribute to documentation. Africa holds extensive reserves of numerous minerals used in industry and energy production. Surpassed only by oil in terms of strategic global issues, the reserves of coal could still last for centuries at current production levels, enabling it to fulfill most of the continent's industrial and domestic energy needs for years to come. Africa accounts for 6% of global coal reserves, due primarily to large resources found in the Proterozoic Karoo basin in South Africa.

The continent's natural gas reserves are the eighth largest in the world, even though Africa produces far less gas than oil—production in 2006 was about 5% of world output (Hong, 2008). The reserves of natural gas in Africa are put at some 7.5% of world total. Some twelve states have deposits of natural gas, and eight countries export, the most important being Algeria, with some 3% of world reserves. The continent's oil reserves are of more strategic global significance, despite the fact that these represent only around 9% of the world's total. Africa, along with the Persian Gulf region, has the most prolific reserves in the world. Africa produced 14% of the world's production of 85.5 million b/d in 2007, with a small number of countries – seven – being responsible for over 80% of the production. While discoveries have been made in recent years in a number of countries, the continent still contributes only about 12% of new finds. A future scenario indicates that the African rate of production is likely to increase. Generally, expanding oil production is encouraged in many countries. Conversely, there is some doubt whether the massive proven reserves of Venezuelan oil will be brought to the market due to macroeconomic and geopolitical reasons.

Arguably, Africa's energy sector is of global significance. African coal, gas, and uranium are increasingly sought after, and its hydro, solar, and bio resources could benefit the carbon market, though depend on improved assessment and implementation. The significance of the African energy sector is increasingly attracting attention from international donors. Mocked as 'The Landscape of Looting' but it is also the diversity of the African energy landscape that provides vast strategic investment and donor opportunities. This essay provides a general overview of the range of the current energy landscape and the strategic challenges and opportunities it poses.

Natural Gas Reserves

Natural gas reserves on the African continent are distributed asymmetrically and include Northern, Western, Eastern, Southern, and several island states. The twelve countries with proven reserves are Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique, Egypt, Libya, Angola, Tanzania, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, and Dr Congo. The largest reserves are found in Algeria, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Owing to concerns about domestic terrorist organizations, oil and gas production in Nigeria is considered high-risk investment and foreign oil and gas companies are discouraged from operating in the Niger Delta. Although Western gas producers have diversified since 2010 to other production areas, they remain dominant in Algeria, and local opposition has partly obstructed commercial gas development in Mozambique. Gas-burning in Southern Africa also occurs in gas-fired power stations, and its export dominates energy markets in Namibia and South Africa.

Natural gas and geopolitics of infrastructure developments in sub-Saharan Africa are receiving considerable attention. New gas pipelines including Nigerian, Mozambican, and Tanzanian projects have been planned. Parallel to these plans, a special interest is in the interregional competition between Western and Chinese energy companies for the acquisition and exploration of new frontiers of natural gas, especially that of East African proven reserves. This development has accumulated evidence of unequal competition and predominantly unfair practices by the Chinese side. To explain this, I outline essential specifications of the sector and highlight the structural power advantages the Western, private sector, more specifically the EU's companies, hold over Chinese counterparts. Subsequently, unequal competition and mainly unfair practices are elucidated through an analysis of negotiations, contract clauses, and industrial policy tools. Generally, environmental and safety standards, planning quality, and the macro-geopolitical relationship across the different agreements clearly are on the EU's side.

Renewable Energy Potential

The African continent is endowed with a wealth of natural resources including significant untapped reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, and an abundance of renewable energy sources. But the ongoing competition between Chinese and European interests over the acquisition of African energy sources has far-reaching consequences on the sustainable development of the continent. The African rivers have the greatest untapped potential at 91 percent of the total technical potential with 85% of it concentrated in only 7 countries. Ethiopia and South Sudan are touted as the next flashpoints for armed conflict due to investments in hydroelectric dams. Meanwhile, it is warned that China's global investment strategy forges unprotected dependencies on debt by establishing an infrastructure that will be repatriated in case of default.

Ghana is the top-ranking sub-Saharan African country for installed capacity amongst countries that classify as developing economies, with South Africa reporting the most for all of Africa. Similarly, the top ten countries for installed capacity in Africa, including Egypt and South Africa, are all in North or Sub-Saharan Africa. However, Nigeria, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have far less installed capacity and potential to generate large levels of electricity based on oil, coal, and hydropower resources. Nevertheless, it is estimated that these three countries combined have the potential to produce twice as much energy as the planetary output due to coal resources alone, 67 times by hydropower, and 220 times with natural gas resources. Africa is also home to a wide variety of renewable sources. All of the solar insolation bands reach areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is estimated that the region could feasibly generate 15 terawatts. Home to the largest desert on the planet, solar generation potential in North Africa, including Egypt, Algeria, and Libya, was one of the first regions on the continent to be exploited. Beyond solar, the continent holds massive amounts of hydropower, biomass-related, and geothermal resources. Despite this, these countries have yet to fully tap the potential of renewables. Brazil, Russia, India, and China dominate the LTOE electricity distribution trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, and Extra-EU supplies over 95% of the energy consumed by the EU.

China's Energy Strategy in Africa

Chinese-European Competition over African energy sources is getting elaborate. The Beijing Declaration and Beijing Action Plan on China-Africa Cooperation as well as China’s White Paper outline the ten areas of cooperation agreed upon. Among them, China and African countries will “cooperate in oil and gas exploration, mining and processing. Encouraging enterprises to participate in energy projects such as coal, hydropower, oil, and natural gas and promote the establishment of clean energy development and utilization cooperatives”. Even though China has just recently started to project military power in far-off weakly defended regions of Africa, numerous publications have already fostered a discussion in international relations about China’s strategic options in Africa. However, the energy strategy of China in Africa has as yet hardly been investigated. This study approaches the issue by examining China’s global hunt for energy.

In 2006 the European and Chinese competition to gain access to African oil, natural gas, and uranium is analyzed. First, Africa as a new field of intervention is related to the needs and strategies of the Party and Government ruling China since 1978. Thereafter this framework is used to explain China’s growing engagement in many parts of the world. Two aspects receive special attention: the relative neglect of the European and Western parts of the USSR and China’s still very limited presence in the OECD-states. Then the channelling of these generally Western Chinese policies towards Africa is analyzed. In a second part, the interaction of the expanding Chinese presence in Africa with other foreign powers – especially the USA, UK, and France as well as China’s oil quest in competitor Latin American states – is discussed. Apart from presenting overall policy, several case studies on Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon, Niger, and the DR Congo are provided.

Investment Patterns

From 2003 to 2005, the global foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa stagnated at about 3% of total world FDI. China and Europe each had the same share of 7% during that time. In 2006, China invested in $900 million FDI in Africa, and the EU invested in $6.96 trillion FDI in Africa, which were 6.36 times the amount of China’s investment. Africa’s global market share increased from 5% to 9% and China’s global market share rose from 1% to 2%. However, while European firms withdrew their capital from Africa, Chinese firms considerably increased their investment capital. Since the collapse from 2008, there was a drop in FDI to Africa, but the African-global FDI share moved up to 15% and the Chinese-global FDI share rose up to 8% in 2009. In 2010, the trade value between China and Africa exceeded $115 trillion, thus establishing a strategic partnership. Along with this, Africa’s share of global market in trade rose by 9% from 8%; $93.17 trillion trade share global market for China was 9% and China’s trade with Africa in increased to 6% from 5%. Therefore, China and Europe had each same share of global market, with 9% of Europe but 3% of China. China’s trade share in the global market transpired a difference of 3% between China and Europe in trade with Africa. Since then, both domestic and international concerns have arisen about the increasing Chinese presence in Africa, and thus have given new impetus for traditional players, especially the European Union, to rethink their strategic framework for FDI in Africa. At the 2004 World Energy Council (WEC), both the EU and China made it explicit that they were looking at the African continent as the forthcoming protagonist in global energy politics. Africa, chiefs of the major energy concerns already prognosticated, would by 2020 be the principal battleground of the Sino-EU energy competition. The EU, with the resettlement of its Natura Resources Directorate-General and the generation of a new sub-department, namely the international unit for gas, coal and oil, was seeking to diffuse its energy import from the traditional exporters such as Russia, North Africa and Norway and thus diversify it. BUFFEREI's Arend Prins called this the 'Third Energy Liberalization Policy Package'; by this strategy, LPG, coal, gas, as well as the untraditional nuclear and renewables, was to be transported to Europe. China, possessing the PIB (Protected Important Benefit), had already began on a large-scale program to take over the African oil and gas fields. While China's National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) had like 2006 bought the British ASA International producing gas field in Benin, but since 2008 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNCP) provided Sudan's President Omar Al-Bashir the necessary military support in his war and demoralization machination against Darfur, many international firms had ceased dealing with it. But China did not have the PIC, and the forthcoming possession of Sudan's petro fields would electrify the EU.

Infrastructure Development

African national markets, including Sudan, began to be more involved in the Chinese market, and in particular in the energy sector, in the early 2000s. The reorientation of the energy policy of the Peoples Republic of China has led to global competition with Europe and elsewhere to obtain access to energy sources. This competition has led to the conclusion of a series of consortia between large national corporations. For the Sudanese case, the first energy deals did not emerge until the mid-1990s, but after the pipeline construction they were boosted in 1999 and continued in a very active way until today.

At a time of greater Chinese activity in the energy sector and increasing competitive activity, the February 2004 deal has already shown that Chinese corporations are not always able to avoid competition between them: even though the agreement stipulated that one corporation would not compete with another in Africa, less than a year and a half later, the Indian corporation launched a bid on several Sudanese blocks in which the other corporation was already participating. In fact, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the Chinese don't seem to be a monolithic global player, but rather to consist of different corporations with their own interests and strategies for their international expansion, though always in accordance with the broad outlines of the Chinese government's foreign policy doing business with rivals or increasing their negative impact in a particular place.

In addition, a brief look at the recent oil and gas statistics shows that Africa is, after the Middle East, the area with the largest Chinese foreign investment on oil and gas exploration and production. This is, to some extent, associated with the strategic importance of Africa as a source of oil, but it is also linked to the fact that many African countries provide preferential economic and political conditions. Africa is a continent with great mineral potential, but at the same time, it has much higher risks associated to exploration in the form of bureaucratic corruption, fraud, lack of infrastructures or armed conflict. China's involvement in the Africa continent late through the oil for infrastructure program by which China agreed to act as a market for Sudanese oil production in exchange of infrastructure construction.

Bilateral Agreements

Bilateral agreements between one African energy producer and either China or European countries inevitably lead to competition between the two parties. This section considers the interaction between Chinese and European contractors in the context of

Angolan crude oil. Both direct competition and adjustments in response to the activities of the other party are discussed. It is found that the dynamics of the Chinese-European discussions at the political level have influenced the opportunities available to the competing firms—that is to say, that the macro level determines the micro level. Four research questions are addressed: To what extent do Chinese entities compete with European entities for Angolan crude oil rent? How far do the Chinese or European entities involved adjust their behaviour as a result of the competitive activities of the other side? Are the Chinese or the European organisations equally likely to enter such disagreement? Behind these general issues, comparisons are made between actors in similar roles in the two entities, indicating that actors in the different sites do not all adopt the same behaviour as their counterparts. Longitudinal empirical research has made it possible to work out the dynamics of Portugal's and the UK's policies of promoting bilateral cooperation in Mozambique between independence in 1975 and the advent of multipartyism in 1992. This context of Angola's most significant donors, significant because both tried, so far unsuccessfully, to include a clause on transparency in their aid-based agreements. The discussion on this clause within the policy-making levels of these two European states respectively follows the implementation of a similar provision in Mozal's fiscal agreement of 1998. This synchronic study is complemented by an analysis of the European Union's external policy towards good governance initiatives and legislation on transparency in extractive industries.

European Energy Policies Towards Africa

After years of reluctance to elaborate a deeper inter-European energy policy, the European Union started with the direct interference of the Commission to get involved in solving single situations. Such dimensions of action and their possible chances are analyzed here in the context of prevailing interests on the continent itself as well as in selected African countries. While for a long time this policy area lay dormant after having bottomed out with the failure of the Protocol of Utrecht. Currently it is driven by a number of factors. Changed transport practices within the single market are starting to alter traditional patterns of energy flows. Emissions regulations have given rise to a variety of direct and indirect pressures on some particular fuels and power plant technologies. Furthermore, the general overhaul of internal markets under way since the ECJ-mandated liberalization of 1986 has just recently started to focus on gas, and, with the Commission's 1988 communication on 'Towards a single market in gas', to factor in the European dimension. At the same time, Africa is emerging as an alternative energy frontier of great interest, first of all in its North and, more recently, sub-Saharan parts. While relevant to trends elsewhere, the discourse on sustainable development provides another set of motivations to consolidate the trend. The EU's competence in the energy domain is a relative novelty, as the Urpflanze were interpreted very restrictively. Additionally even among the cooperation-minded member states, divergent national interests have generally prevented the development of joint initiatives in the field. The involved political sensitivities, in addition to difficulties related to the structure of Decision-making, have conspired to further reduce any comprehensive approach. Given this, appeals to an ENP energy framework at the occasion of the 2006 Panama match seem far-fetched. Indeed, no articulation of broad guidelines on these issues is evident on the Commission's part. Only piecemeal initiatives, mostly having to do with the political and institutional selling of energy market reform, have been floated. On the other hand, a number of member states, mostly from the import-dependent South and East, but with a possible gap between the environmentalist revival. An attempt to use the energy area to bolster credibility as 'world player' should, however, overcome the traditionally narrow commercial and political diplomacy the Greater Rome has hitherto delegated to the international level. At any rate, it is still far from clear where and how the Community as a whole might seek to acquire the tools to stake out a legitimate role in a number of disputed matters concerning its southern neighborhood.

EU's Energy Security Strategy

EU's Energy Security Strategy includes three main policy priorities: the development of an Energy Union, development of an "integrated and interoperable" energy network and increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix, benefiting from "competitive and open" global markets. The European Energy Security Strategy includes the three main policy priorities of (i) the development of a policy proposal for the "immediate short-term", intended to enable "collective response to mitigate potential future gas supply crises" (ii) the development of a new Energy Diplomacy Action Plan; and (iii) the proposal of a framework for gas purchasing "from non-EU countries". A common approach to gas purchases should aim at the development of better mechanisms for cooperation to reduce vulnerability. EU Member States should not lose sight of the broader European Energy Security Strategy, and should remain aware of the broader dynamics in Europe's relations with their key suppliers. Russia remains a very important trading partner for energy and especially gas with Europe, and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The foreseen potentiality of antitrust action cannot and should not be taken lightly, but careful assessment, apt negotiations and representation of all stakeholders' interests and the principles on which the EU project is founded is necessary in order to avoid further escalation of the problem. On 22 September 2005, the European Council recognised the need for a European Energy Policy to address the "major energy challenges". The European Council on 8–9 March 2007 agreed to three specific energy targets for 2020: a decrease in primary energy use by 20 percent compared to projections, an increase in the share of renewable energy sources (mainly wind, solar and bio-fuels) in energy use to 20%, and an increase to 10% in the share of bio-fuels in energy use in transportation. The EU's Energy Security Strategy includes three main policy priorities: (i) the development of a comprehensive approach to address "both the internal and external dimensions" of European energy security, in terms of natural gas, (ii) the development of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to enable "cooperation and dialogue" between Member States, and in the most "far-reaching cases" between "non-EU countries" (especially suppliers and transitors) and (iii) the exploration of the potentiality of using collective buying power to negotiate "more favourable" gas purchasing agreements.

3. Results and Discussion

A. Investment Initiatives

There are differences in the way China approaches foreign direct investments (FDI) in Africa compared to Western countries. China's enterprises enjoy flexible, informal and less comprehensive support from their home state compared to European companies. While Chinese companies mainly employ unskilled or semi-skilled labour, firms from colonial powers prefer permanent expatriate or high-skilled employees from their former colonies [6].

Whereas Chinese policy bank loans focus on agriculture, infrastructure, mining and energy generation, loans granted by traditional donors to the South are six times more prone to concentrate on education, health, and government and financial services [7]. Furthermore, Chinese banks condition the granting of loans to non-interventions in domestic affairs. These differences notwithstanding, the tone of Chinese policy-makers on African governments' corrupt practices and land grabbing is constrain-free and business-oriented. By contrast, the narrative of Western donor representatives often contain conditionality on respect for human rights, gender equality, rule of law or pluralism [8].

The Chinese 'flexible cooperation strategy' on Africa allows Beijing to invest in high-risk countries with negative democratic and human rights records. Such a strategic choice would be 'contradictory' for Western actors due to internal domestic pressures. Moreover, whereas the EU human rights discourse is predominantly based on state capacity building and judiciary reform, Chinese experts and scholars debate the democratic deficit of

Western cities and not that of authoritarian African governments. Finally, a language gap in translation worsens the understanding by Western counterparts of the comprehensive (and inclusive) approach to legitimacy in the African public sphere as defined by the Chinese discourse [9].

B. Partnerships with African Nations

Although much attention has been paid to overlapping Chinese-European rivalry over different African regions, energy interests should be at the heart of Chinese-European competition over Africa. China and Europe both seek key resources for their industrial development, and both the European and Chinese cases suggest geographic divergence, with the Chinese drawing on African energy sources, the Europeans diversifying among different energy sources. The Chinese-European competition over Africa is not confined to energy, and existing scholarship does a poor job as regards these questions, in particular regarding Chinese strategies and alliances with African states [10]. There are notable exceptions, such as . However, although it lays the bulk of its emphasis on an analysis of historical maps, and a “thickly descriptive idiom” tailored for East African administrators, its account would deliver major benefits for East African historians and additional context for the details of the Anathi traders discussed in the following section more than painting a convincing picture of Chinese consolidation, contending earlier Soviet interests over the region. fails to engage with vital questions pertaining to Chinese strategy. Regarding Chinese policy over African energy sources, the question of how policies of alliance are related to the wider strategic course of the economy is central to an understanding of the significance of the Chinese-Ethiopian defense agreement [11]. The internal development strategies pursued by dependent economies are also crucial to any understanding of the resources these countries can then offer other powers, as is the wider international context. There are also lacunae regarding the strategic questions posed by Chinese-Ethiopian “aid”, particularly the nature of military “aid”. Pertinent questions are raised in this regard by . The means by which the NPC and EPLF use their Soviet and European contacts for both intelligence, and wider support strategies are also left unexplored. A final question concerns the broader significance of strategic intervention by China in the form of their prepositioning American oil rigs in the Ethiopian Red Sea at Al Dalla. Its significance lies not in any inherent importance, but rather in its potential to disrupt the established Soviet bloc red gold empire route, in conjunction with the strategies that will be discussed below, of intelligence.

C. Geopolitical Implications of Energy Competition

China's Front Porch

In this more global sense, additional resources will make it easier for China to switch supplies from one place to another to meet emergencies or to take speculative advantage of changing prices. China's global investment strategy in oil and other commodities includes increasing exploration and refining capacity, expanding pipelines, more bunkering facilities and a blue water navy. Taken in isolation, individual projects do not constitute the 'String of Pearls' that some claim China is constructing in the Indian Ocean region. But taken together, combined with the emerging diplomatic and military strategies, these developing nations might just be the jewels adorning China's front porch [12].

Sino-European Competition in Africa

The rapidly expanding economies in China and India have gone a long way to breaking through the old monopolies of Western economic dominance. Europe is looking at new and old defence and security structures as well as trying to fashion common economic, diplomatic and military responses [13]. These entirely rational reactions to a changing world all seem to miss the fact that more than anyone else, the energy hungry Chinese already took the strategic and military importance of Africa's oil and natural gas seriously over a decade ago. That is to say, while Europe has been convulsing itself with endless restructuring, so called enlargement and the inclusion of economically backward nations, Sudan and Angola, two of the main oil suppliers to China, have both bought sophisticated Chinese military systems and services in ways expressly designed to secure oil supplies [14].

Influence on African Governance

The Chinese-European competition for access to Africa's oil and gas deposits has so far almost been exclusively examined from a commercial perspective. This competition, however, is so intense and so comprehensive that it involves and affects various dimensions of the world economy, geopolitics, and by far more urgent foreign policy priorities than paying with life for high discount bounty. Amongst the broader aspects of this doctrinal concern is whether the already current outcomes of this competition favourably influence African governance, a sine qua non requirement for beneficial transformative change validated by the African Union Agenda 2063.

European policy purposefulness in Africa's energy policy area remains more or less the same since the long standing post-colonial European power traditions recently sublimed into the mutually documented strategy of 2002, which is basically dictated by the energy security imperative and is embedded into the EU's 'comprehensive approach' to the unified global energy strategy. The large energy deficit, despite some exemptions confirming the rule, brings about a "dual dependency": in economic terms, significantly augmented by the 2004 Union enlargement, reflected in the EU's external energy bill reaching 545% in 2008; at the same time the supply security of the European energy industry severely suffering the competition from large-scale exporters is also mediately threatened by unsustainability vulnerability of the NAFTA/Zones of Peace security mantra that aprioristically excludes all military threats to the European security well beyond NATO's Article 5 mutual assistance obligations [15]. Official figures demonstrate this interplay: "In the EU, oil remains the largest energy source. Oil represented 34% of EU27 primary energy consumption in 2010, with gas in second place at exactly 24% and the nuclear energy at 14%."

China's gainful African strategy based on the continentally immense energy resources broad yet carefully shunned forum shopping labelled the scope for bidding war, primarily tilts towards Sudan. African energy politicians provided stealth Beijing with critical support in the Sino-American disputes, turning the African Continent into highly strategic asset. Impressively the African, mainly Arab League states unreservedly backed Beijing in votes of censure in the UNHR Commission, defeating the West's Nigerian resolution with the margin 80:77. Subsequent the Beijing Olympic Games, African leaders had to choose between hosting his holiness Dalai Lama against the 2008 EU-Africa Lisbon summit; it was boycotted by Heads of States from only 4 Southern European States, as the ten-yearly encounters had always been so far. This diplomatic disaster on part of the EU is largely explained by their negative economic interests' stakeholders in China-Africa booming commerce [16].

Regional Stability

China needs to bring energy into China which requires a stable geopolitical environment. There are two regional stability problems. Both the Central Asian and Middle Eastern routes pass through Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, which have been involved in either local conflicts or warfare. In the case of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan provided arms and ammunition to the militants resisting to the Soviet intrusion due to the common enemy. Now that the common enemy is vanished, India has been cozying up to Afghanistan. China felt isolated, being on the opposite side of the alliance, and Mao reacted violently. The Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister explicitly made statements that the China-Pakistan friendship is as strong as a mountain [17].

There is a widespread perception in the media and policy circles, especially in the global North, that rapid economic growth in China and India not only has driven up the global demand for energy and raw materials like oil, coal, and steel, but also has intensified international competition over these resources with the industrialized countries of the European Union (EU) and North America. Europe, however, focused mostly on the Middle East and the Regions of the Former Soviet Union. Of late, affected by the Russian suspension of gas supply to Europe via Ukraine in both January 2006 and 2009 and the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, and even before that by the rapidly rising demand for energy in China and India, the EU has come to realize the importance of assuring stable energy supplies by diversifying countries and enhancing diplomatic relations with them. Fortuitously, there is in the neighborhood of Europe a potential alternative source of energy which could ease its growing anxiety about the security of energy supplies [18]. But not fortuitously, the European energy security policy may conflict with Chinese efforts to secure energy supplies.

Global Energy Markets

With their economic strength, the People's Republic of China, the second highest oil importer worldwide, and the European Union are engaging in growing competition over whether and how to harness Africa's energy resources. This competition has tangible effects on African states and their strategies to benefit from their riches through political and economic agreements. The paper quantifies the significance of the Chinese and European markets for Africa's exports and draws parallels between the strategies of commercial Chinese and EU companies investing in the oil sectors of non-exporting African countries. The conclusion contains an overview of the paper's findings, which should spur future research by highlighting pivotal avenues. Key questions are: How do the European Union and China strategically reach out for Africa's energy markets? What are the effects of this competition on African states? Finally, in this context, what political or economic agreements are being forged? In light of the competing effort by the Panama Canal Authority to control increased traffic from a widening of the Panama Canal, this paper also touches upon the infrastructure aspects of the Chinese/EU competition.

Driven by colonial history and cultural ties, the European Union (EU) remains Africa's most vital commercial partner and donor, though it has lost importance in both regards since the 1990s. In terms of investment, it lags notably behind. Recent initiatives, such as the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that have been signed with 36 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) partners are more an indictment of the EU's weakness than a sign of strength. This regional policy is explained in the quest to counteract the Chinese presence. Building on the "Policy Coherence for Development" commitment, however, the EU's strategic perceptions have changed negatively towards China since approximately 2007. Hyperion Power Generation found little support in the EU for its ambitions. By contrast, "Countries like Brazil, China, and Ghana and organisations like the United Nations through the UNEP and the World Bank are showing considerable interest in the project".

D. Environmental Considerations

Interest in the natural resources of Africa has grown significantly over the past decade. The increase in demand for resources such as oil, gas, coal, uranium, and other ores can be attributed to the rapid economic growth of emerging economies, especially China, India, and certain other Asian countries. In 2011, China replaced the USA as the largest oil importer from Africa. China has already become the European Union's [EU] primary trading partner with the African continent, which contributes to what the EU calls "inevitable competition." There is reason to believe that energy would be the main focus of the Chinese-EU struggle over access to Africa's natural resources, which was announced by the echo of political and diplomatic statements.

The environmental considerations are substantially similar and in both cases seriously questionable. China's energy industry has grown rapidly and as a result, the fast economic growth of the Chinese economy. However, to maintain such a growth, China needs foreign fossil fuels, especially liquid hydrocarbons, since China has relatively few oil deposits. Representing the Chinese state-owned oil companies have operated in Africa since the early 2000s. First African-Chinese oil deals were concluded at the turn of the 21st century, from 2002 to 2004. Most of the Chinese oil investments in Africa are focused on Sub-Saharan Africa. Chinese investment in oil, gas, and coal projects is increasingly concentrated on strategic African states (mainly Nigeria and Angola in the case of oil and gas). Moreover, the construction of a network of Chinese oil installations is intended to ensure stable oil extraction, compilation, and transport of oil by sea for the needs of the Chinese market. The expansion of Chinese oil drilling is irrevocably linked with the destruction of the unique biosphere of the environment, carrying a negative effect on the natural resources and health of the population of the surrounding areas.

Impact of Energy Extraction

Growing Competition in Africa: China versus 'The West' Chinese-European Competition over African Energy Sources

Energy extraction is intrinsically less labour intensive than other forms of energy generation and pollutes the environment. Furthermore, it often flows through pipelines or on tankers rather than through the grid benefiting only the local area. There are increasing concerns that upcoming Sino-European competition over African energy sources might lead to a contingent of the continent's nation states being auctioned off to the highest bidder. Ensuring the just and sustainable use of energy is one modality through which African prosperity might be achieved. Influenced by the Whartonism of German dispensary tradition and a mercantilist reading of the 19th century 'Scramble for Africa', many contemporary observers see a ruthless rivalry emerging, with third party African countries leveraged like pawns in a game of chess. German economic heavyweight hopes mostly pin on the fact that their grandiosely named "globo'orters" are by one measure or another morselizing the "Alten Welt"avi: tilting the scales in their favour. Nevertheless, this year, for the first time in history Europe sits on an enormous reservoir of centrally positioned African wealth, access to which no longer relies on the flukes of sea trade, evoking a considerably noticeable self-confident mood across the Atlantic.

Growing Competition in Africa: China versus 'The West' The rapid development of the People's Republic of China in recent years has presented itself as a major player on the world stage, resulting in widespread speculation, fear, and worry among international relations scholars and politicians in the European Union and the United States. This chapter seeks to uncover whether there is an increase in Sino-European competition, with Africa as the main prize. Drawing upon literary analysis, and duly informed by field research conducted in the United States, Europe, and Tanzania, key concerns and objections are outlined and discussed. A booming export economy is closely connected to the rapid industrialization, investment, and infrastructure development that recently unfolded on the Eurasian supercontinent. Not surprisingly, with the development of Chinese industry and infrastructure, the demand for natural resources such as unprocessed minerals, gas, and oil has increased manifold. On the supply side – rapid industrialization, and the lack of a domestic energy source – has made China the world's leading importer of energy, a role that China is supposed to maintain for the foreseeable future. China's vast iron and steel sector alone churns energy like no other production facility, and all this energy does not only come from coal, but increasingly from cleaner burning natural gas that is mostly obtained by large LNG. The major global shift in energy sourcing yields a wave of underway and planned pipeline, subterranean LNG ports and refineries to the exploitation of the East African oil- and gas fields in Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, or Uganda. This fieldwork of Greenland proportions presents a major answer to the vast geopolitical ramifications floating in the air of Beijing and Berlin.

Sustainable Practices

Sustainable practices: The potential for national ecological standards in Sino-African cooperation

"(1) Given the rapid growth and bilateral nature of Chinese involvement, the proliferation of Chinese assistance, investment, and trade regimes in Africa, and the increasingly wide range of Chinese actors involved in the development of cultural products, on the one hand, and environmental knowledge and regulation, on the other, it is important to monitor these to ensure positive rather than negative spillover effects."

"(2) In conjunction with Chinese actors at the regional and national levels, African actors—the government and private sector, civil society groups, and individuals—must be proactive to anticipate and mitigate the potential negative impacts of Sino-African trade, investment, and technical cooperation to set the rules for future eco-development."

"The implications of these recommendations are by no means limited to African partners. Since the environment is a public good, the unchecked growth of environmentally damaging activities in various countries will ultimately lead to the global crisis."

Climate Change and Energy Policies

Climate change is assumed to be global warming and is caused by increased CO2 from burning fossil fuels. The African nations are in a common situation in that they do not pollute very much in terms of CO2s when looked at globally. However, they are not so delighted to celebrate because the global warming that will follow is assumed to have terrible consequences for the African continent. Africa is expected to face a sharp increase in population as the 21st century advances. The continent's population is now around one billion and is estimated to double within a generation. The positive corollaries of this are that while the bulk of the add-on in global population will likely occur in Africa and on its northern edge, there is no problem with agriculture, provided irrigation is generally forthcoming since such a tiny part of African arable land is irrigated. Rapidly growing populations may become a critical political and possibly economic threat in such a context. The major topic is that African nations have access to incredibly few energy resources and the meager ones they have access to are likely to accelerate their poverty rather than their wealth, a general corollary of the well-known 'resource curse'. These remakes in perceptions will be peculiarly visible in the realm of viewing caducous energy sources. The completely new forms of renewables will belong to the future (solar, wind, geo-thermal) while the very old forms of renewables are now assumed to belong to the past, viz. wood and coal. For a period, so-called charcoal or wood coal were so capital to African energy that they can now be regarded as a thing of the past or present at best in others than very marginal form. However, it is a paradigm shift following on the Beijing Olympics that the scale of wood coal use is completely unsustainable and some of the Chinese government's responses are replicated on other grounds. Africa faces an existential problem in that projections indicate it will be the part of the world most able to hinder potable water by 2040. At a time when lakes and rivers are shrinking and degraded (particularly by dumping of heavy metals) and where underground water is difficult to access just because Africa pays the highest water prices in the world in importing pumping hardware.

E. Case Studies

Two case studies are focusing on the Chinese-European competition over African energy sources, one concerning Angola and the other Nigeria. Both nations are part of Sub-Saharan Africa and oil-producers. Furthermore, both countries serve as contrasting study cases as today's two donors compete in these nations. This section delves into the energy sector of Nigeria and Angola, the extent to which the countries were and or still are acquirable providers of oil and gas; the role of China and the EU in the energy sector; and, finally, an outline for how the ACE partnership could be potentially invest Africa's oil producers.

Nigeria is the world's seventh-largest country by population counting 232.7 million people in 2024, and it is located in the Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa. Regarding its energy market, the country is one of the world's leading oil producers, ranking the 13th in 2008. In 2012, the oil production comprised about 2.3 million barrels a day, which implies 77% of government revenues, and 40% of the GDP of the nation. Moreover, Nigeria disposes of a large natural gas deposit, ranking the ninth in terms of proven reserves. The EU is Nigeria's largest trading partner, the nations maintain trade relations since the 1950s. The main import goods from the European countries are industrial manufactures, whereas Nigeria has a lack of high-valued goods.

The energy market of Angola is also predominated by oil exploration, being its main export. Contrary to Nigeria, where the oil is extracted by swamps in the Niger Delta, in Angola oil is explored in the offshore, which automatically signifies that the country does not confront risks of oil leakages. The oil sector of Angola was spearheaded the economy of the nation during peace. Due to poor infrastructure, the oil is mostly re-exported by supertankers, with a total of 95% of exports going out through the sea. Taxes on oil account 40% of the GDP of the nation, and 37% of the state income, making this African state get highly reliant on the black gold. Europe was Angola's leading trading partner almost throughout the Cold War era, and EU imports from Angola now represent 5% of the total; also due to the growing production of oil.

China in Angola

With the entry of China into the globalized capitalist world, economic competition has increased globally and Europe's interests are challenged in many areas. To a large extent, Europe continues to dominate large parts of the world through neocolonial forms and determines to use development aid for Africa to limit Chinese influence there and to represent China as a new colonial power. The Chinese side is based on the experience of having been subdued by Europeans for many years and tries to act on equal terms with each other on the basis of cooperation and joint development in its relations with African states and the African Union. Political anti-imperialism and a common history provide the basis for such policy in Africa.

To secure the future of industrialized capitalism, such raw material acquisitions would be a different topic. In the new colonial territories dominated by European countries, empires and multinational corporations and their paramilitary organizations, political and economic risks are not very high and they can hardly be calculated at the expense of the trade and profit deficit. The increased engagement with the armed forces in Africa also contributes to the accumulation of experience such as mercenary deployments, civil war management, mutinies, power struggles, betrayal, and international aid. In the context, rivalry for political and economic interests is a common experience. Knowing about this experience and the ways of acting would be nothing new on the African side. France may have the best long-term experience in the development of decolonization and the establishment of military cooperation to ensure a neo-colonial development.

Europe in Nigeria

The increasing number of Nigerian immigrants constitutes a potential problem of mass returns whenever job opportunities disappear in Europe. In 2005, Nigerian officials, along with those of Niger and Algeria, showed an interest in Russia's strategy for African energy sources security. The same year they joined in the New Partnership for African Development Initiatives to bring about closer cooperation with the G8. It was during this summit that Russia made clear its support for the African nations in their negotiations about the oil and gas prices. As a part of it, the Nigerian officials made an agreement with Gazprom, the newly nationalized Russian oil company, created through the merger of gas monopolies onto state assets. The Russian party will supply Nigeria with liquid gas. This is a result of the G8 diplomacy, with which several Member States participate. It started with the summit, aimed at countering the Asia-centric policy of China and India, both future oil and gas superpowers. Also, Ukrainian officials joined the summit as observers, asking for transparency in gas prices. A further issue is the adaptative strategy of Russian energy giant companies, such as Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz or Gazprom, to search for sources in more secure geopolitically areas of the globe. Nigeria, as a result of this, came under strategic attention for the possible opening of oil and gas prospects. In return for these endeavors, the Russian Energy Ministry agreed to the transmission of technological know-how in LNG production, further opening the opportunities for the Russian equipment and its services on the finished goods.

Joint Ventures in Renewable Energy

The African continent has a shortage of energy estimated at 160 to 170 gigawatts. Population growth and industrial development are expected to double the demand for electricity within the next 15 to 20 years. Only about 31% of Africa's total population has access to modern energy services. Renewable energy sources are viewed by numerous African governments as a potential source to help address power deficits, both through on-grid and off-grid renewable energy systems linked to hydropower, wind energy, solar PV, and hybrid systems. In recent years, solar, biomass, geothermal, and small hydropower projects have been developed to help alleviate the need for electricity in a number of African countries. This is especially the case in the more geographically and environmentally vulnerable African regions and countries, such as the Sahel region. Given China's interest in and commitment to investing in renewable energy and hydropower on the continent, the objective of this research is to better understand the nature, extent, and potential implications of Chinese energy investments in Africa, including detailed investigation of how joint venture arrangements between Chinese and African companies may be affecting local business development, technology transfer, and employment, as well as the capacity of African governments to regulate and monitor the environmental and social impacts thereof. This research is particularly timely as China's rapidly escalating 'going out policy' sees a growing number of Chinese firms securing energy concessions in Africa, ranging from southwestern Sudan to the DRC and Ethiopia. At the same time, the number of these joint venture contracts (JVCs) forming Chinese, Asian, and African investment partnerships in the energy sector is rapidly increasing. China's heightened interest in Africa's diverse energy resources is driven by rapidly rising domestic demand for fuel and resources to feed China's rapidly expanding economy. As the global price of these resources continues to increase, and availability for export diminishes, access to energy resources is increasingly regarded as an extension of state strategy. Crowned the second largest consumer of oil, China is now seeking to secure long-term energy sources abroad, with Africa being seen as a 'key strategic sourcing region.' have documented the effect of China's rapidly expanding 'oil hunt' in Africa. Through a series of significant oil sector FDI, agreements, producer service contracts, and state support packages, China has now displaced the US to become Africa's largest oil export destination. In 2011, 10-20% of Chinese imports of crude oil now come from Africa. However, China's rush to secure energy supplies in Africa is not limited to the oil sector. Given the continent's vast and underdeveloped resources, various Chinese state-owned companies and conglomerates have engaged in aggressive oil, gas, coal, mineral, and energy generation asset acquisitions across the continent.

F. Economic Impacts on African Nations

The aggressive race for Africa's resources or supply-security considerations? How and why the E.U. is setting up an alliance to vie for African energy sources with the

Chinese. The Africa Union, a "child" of an European initiative will most likely be exploited or gently guided into the arms of the West. Renewable energies foreseen as a primary source of energy security for the African Countries which are not the beneficiaries of extensive or very contrasted energy resources.

In spite of increasingly frequent symmetric exchanges in the security and intelligence realms, Beijing and the Western old continent are at odds over a number of high-profile international issues, and this is likely to get always worse in parallel with China's increasing economic and military influence. One of the main sources of tensions is located in the African continent: both are getting ever more competitive over energy sources. While China has this thrust to sign long term energy security contracts with the African major producers of energy, the European Community institutions are engaged in a wide-ranging and ambitious policy of creation of partnerships with African Countries aiming at the co-production of energy from renewable sources.

The entente between Imperial Germany, the greatest landlocked continental power with potent naval ambitions and very high demographics, and the Japan of the Meiji restoration was concluded in 1902. In recent years, an informal network of government officials and scientists from the key African and E.U. nations, as well as African members of the European Parliament, have been mapping out a 21st century vision of the Africa-E.U. to address issues of trade, security, development and the environment. The central tenet of this vision was energy. Africa is the only continent projected to have substantial increases in energy. With the right resource mobilisation and capacity building, renewable energy could be a primary source of energy security for the 67% of African. But while some African countries do not have access to electricity at all, the grand African renewable initiative was launched in 2010 to generate 20 GW of new renewable electricity in Africa by 2020.

Job Creation

The magnitude of job creation is the major driver of public narratives and policy initiatives about the economics of foreign investment. The specific focus is the treatment of Chinese investments in extractive industries in Africa. The European Union (EU) rather than individual European countries is the focus of a comparative analysis. EU foreign direct investment (FDI) flows towards Africa still considerably exceeded those from China in 2014. Understanding the differences and similarities in labour and employment impacts can be set within broad political economic dynamics of Europe and China in Sub-Saharan Africa. Job creation is a significant issue both in Africa-China relations and internal Chinese debates and there is ample literature addressing the topic (Oya, 2019). Certain patterns are by now well-established, though estimates vary significantly. It has been found that the new employment has been predominantly casual labour depending on subcontracting or wage-labour in small workshops or crews, with limited skills transfer since the jobs created are mostly of low value-added.

The majority of job creation has been in the field of construction, while the manufacturing sector has been subject to dereliction caused by other factors, such as overinvestments in the sector in the 1990s due to urban development obligations coming from the State, or the relocation of Chinese light industry with cheaper labour costs abroad. Using the most recent available Chinese and European country-specific data, between 2011 and 2013 the EU invested also resulted in three times more job creation than the Chinese, on average per year in 54 reporting African countries. The dominance of European investments in Africa for job creation is still similar.

Revenue Generation

Economic benefits tied to oil production do not necessarily generate prosperity for the population as a whole. In general, there is a correlation between sound governance, for example, effective institutions to reduce corruption, and economic prosperity. African citizens sometimes view China's Silent Invasion as being at odds with such economic progress. In summary, concessions for extraction rights are apparently given to Chinese state-owned companies without a bidding process. This has lead to a situation where numerous investigations have suggested that Angola especially has been drained of funds gained through oil. People have come to call the government 3B, referring to the son-in-law of the then president and his children, their family's extensive wealth coming from land concessions of oil-producing territory that have originated on terms disadvantageous to the country.

Not only is the accumulation of capital hindered by the spoils system associated with the state, but oil production goes entirely to the elite without the necessity for labor from the rural sector, thus nullifying any industrial urbanization that would have taken place through ISI had there been a secondary sector development strategy. As a result, the Rust Belt was depopulated due to widespread unemployment, with work increasing in agriculture and services. It might be interpreted that said influx of cheap goods, which effectively destroyed the industrial sector, is tied to the deal made when states are given credits directly tied to future oil production growth. This deindustrialization also has very detrimental effects for the environment. Despite being relatively small in comparison with figures from Chinese investments in other parts of the world, statistics from 2005 to 2017 suggest Chinese lending goes primarily to transportation and energy, both infrastructural elements of the primary sector, and increasingly concentration of land cultivation, the latter of which includes cultivation and agribusiness forestry.

Dependency Risks

Attempts from the European Union to gain access to African raw materials can be dated back to the 1980s, when the so-called Lomé-Convention was still in place. Since then, four different agreements between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACPS) have been concluded, providing ACP-countries preferential access to the European market. The negotiation of these agreements may be seen as attempts by the EU to create some kind of dependency with respect to manufacturing goods, substituting Asia's economies. Criticists interpret the strategies of the European Commission as intentions to generate high levels of dependency among ACP-countries, thus consolidating the North-South divide and repeating post-colonialism's exploitation mode. Dependency, however, is always a multi-levelled process, which is why a brief glance at the other side of the coin is indispensable to gain a more comprehensive picture concerning the positions of the both transnational actors – EU and China. The EU accuses China – much like Saudi Arabia, India or Russia – of pursuing an imperialist strategy in Africa, since Chinese goods inundate the European market too, and since Beijing increasingly attracts African raw materials, constraining the EU and as an extreme preventing (mainly British and French) firms from extracting African raw materials. Lower environmental and social standards in China would allow the Chinese to offer higher prices than European integrations. In broader terms, many member states are afraid to lose the race not only to China, but to the U.S. as well, which also piles Africa's president's homes full of dollars. For this very reason, France advocates the application of high standards to its own companies only, in order to open a backdoor for its own firms to exploit the African continent's resources.

G. Future Trends in Energy Competition

The U.S. governed AFRICOM, which coordinates U.S. and European Union military activities in Africa, strongly opposes Chinese-African cooperation, and China is responding assertively, negotiating rights of course with Sudan the construction of military and electronic facilities in North Sudan. For instance, the operation of unmanned drones and respective American control facilities over and in African airspace is broadening, confirmed by respective construction and reconnaissance activities in Uganda, Central African Republic, and according to reliable sources in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In these activities the U.S. government is only seeking the permission of the politically responsible authorities, which in most cases are only quasi-legitimate with no national mandate. Since these activities affect different rebel interests, military and civilian casualties are increasing, leading to a significant and challenging upsurge in violence in early winter. Given a politically uncontrollable scale of the expected atrocities, the U.S. approach will shift to AFRICOM organized direct military intervention in early spring.

This perspective clarifies most chronologies in regards to the preliminary dialogue between South Sudan and Sudan, the outsourcement of AFRICOM-related proxy activities, the internal Bad South Sudanese government difficulties, the secession referendum, and the candidacies for South Sudanese presidential elections. The South has formed its own oil company, but disputes are already emerging about which side has the right to grant concessions for future oil exploration. The majority partner in the South's Upper Nile oilfields is Chinese. Summarily, the Nile transport dispute or activity, international military presence or activity in the South, the tabletop discussions and the start of the new extortion season will lead to military action. The situation is expected to escalate rapidly, with significant impact on the ongoing defense and border discussions, broader African interests and rebel/ resistance operations. Since the Juba government will interpret any U.S. government intervention as unjust and intrusive, it will lead to a significant open confrontation.

Emerging Markets

Africa is emerging as the new global battleground where Chinese and European energy companies compete for access to raw materials. Western energy wholesalers are trying to safeguard their established business, while Chinese enterprises are intent on gaining a foothold in what is set to become the world's most lucrative energy market. So far, the European Union has not extensively been involved in the already fierce competition between China, India, and Africa over and within Africa. European energy wholesalers are however increasingly concerned about the new Chinese presence in Africa. The EU would be well advised to join the European energy wholesalers in preparing for the Chinese challenge. Today, at the twilight of fossil fuel globalization, energy safety is tantamount to safeguarding customers and suppliers, who in turn have to interact with the emerging Asian suppliers. Diplomatic institutions urgently need to address the issue of the emerging Chinese energy challenge. China first obtained a claim on Angolan crude in 2004. Presently, Angola is the third most important source for Chinese crude imports, trailing only behind Iran and Saudi Arabia. Chinese imports from Africa have soared from 127 million tons in 2002 to 449 million tons in 2006 and are currently increasing by more than 50% percent a year. In 2006, Brazil overtook China as the main export market for Angolan crude. There was much speculation concerning the incentives that led Angola to switch from China to Brazil as the export destination for crude. Many commentators believed that given Angola's desperate need for sanitary sewerage, China bribed Angola with a $4 billion credit line for infrastructure to 'voluntarily' give up its foray into Petrobras's preserve. Yet, while already repeatedly renegotiated Chinese credits went through, the matching Brazilian offer took two years to be signed. Japan lies further to the east than Angola and therefore requires less fuel for shipping. Also, China's stock price in the crude-for-infrastructure program has severely diminished due to its failures to comply with the infrastructure deals or the payments on the infrastructure credits that were earlier agreed upon. It is therefore likely that deeper geopolitical considerations have prompted Angola to partially revoke the esoteric strategic alliance signed with China. A course of action Japan readily supports through João Bernardo de Miranda. A case in point is a recent unorthodox investigative probe compiled by a consulting firm; the 2 moved its headquarters to the Swiss canton of Zug, directly across the border from the Union of Baneese Principates. The originator of this consultancy, highly-decorated Major Anderson Saito, a former member of the Division of Criminal Investigation, which forms the main investigative tentacle of the Brazilian

Federal Police. His decision to alter the status quo was triggered by a painful loveless marriage with a rich, but abusive Brazilian cephalopod who plunged him into a spiral of protracted depression and long benders fuelled by weekends and frequent episodes of drug abuse. The wife brought in route of the circumstances, a marriage contract stating that no sex, whatsoever, should occur between the two. Finally ending the tormenting partnership. The French acquaintance, an accomplished nuclear physicist by the name of François-Xavier Fudge, convinced Saito, aided by libidinous disillusionment, junk-food cravings and alcohol-inspired bravado; to invest his entire divorce settlement in an exclusive, highly-directional satellite imagery software program used for both commercial and specific military projects. Up to this point, due to a complete lack of knowledge in computer science, with Saito under the delusion that it was possible to easily enter the US electronic gaming industry and develop, with the help of local technicians, a high quality state-of-the art video game titled 'Kamikaze Wasps versus Las Vegas Zombies.' But, faced with fierce competition from several companies, mainly the infamous, makers of the highly successful 'The Great Ass Explorations' franchise, which cleverly circumvented copy rights of mainstream children videogames and turned them into violent, misogynistic and sexually explicit garbage, soon realized they were not technically apt to take on such an endeavor. The GPS software, in conjunction with Macintosh's cutting-edge stealth technology with a user-friendly mobile PC platform, enabled the user to pinpoint any location on the planet with an unrivalled precision of three meters. Subsequent upgrades including real time image transfer and topographical information overlaid on the images in real time. In addition to that, the software was equipped with a proprietary high resolution BlackBerry remotely configured by direct satellite downlink to fusion centers - combination of the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency entity, Defense Intelligence Agency, and State and Local Law enforcement venues – located in the most economically active and debt-ridden cities on the US eastern seaboard. Given his money woes, bankrolled by his prompt relationship with a conglomerate managing a handful of massage parlors in the district, phase one of Saito's incisively investigative enterprise focused on leveraging the reputation of Fudge and the impressive technical capabilities of the Macintosh's satellite imagery software.

Technological Innovations

New, more varied forms of competition emerging between China and Europe as traditional areas of economic engagement transform. China's initial involvement in parts of Africa is driven by a more overtly geo-strategic concern. Procuring oil to fuel the growing Chinese economy is frequently deemed as underpinning Beijing. However, the ramping up of Chinese investment in Africa's energy sector more generally – into both coal and renewable projects – could easily be seen as part of an emerging 'big game' over African energy sources. - Bilateral aid & investments China's investment profile in the energy sector is set to transform Sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, Chinese authorities put $12 billion on the table for African energy projects, some $7 billion of which is pledged for power generation. A significant part of this investment is slated for the construction of a new generation of coal-fired power stations. China jockeying for control of the new coal ports. Needless to say, new coal-fire projects are a highly contested area of development in South Africa. Due to both the massive water required for cooling and yet because a new generation of coal-power stations are by far the dirtiest way to supplement a new energy mix. A string of court cases are trying to hold up the construction of these new power plants but the Enemalta deal slipped through unnoticed. Europe, which is already heavily invested across South Africa's energy sector, is similarly involved in the construction of one of these massive new coal-fired power stations.

Shifts in Global Energy Demand

Since the beginning of the new century there has been a noticeable and widely visible shift in energy-related matters with several African nations. There are new security interests and issues on energy matters. Energy issues are playing an increasingly important role in Chinese-European relations and competition over African energy sources. Since the beginning of the 21st century, shifts in global energy demand and its impact on supply have intensified international competition for access to and control over energy sources has progressively intensified. Africa has emerged as one of the increasingly important arenas for international powers due to its rich energy resources. As some commentators have warned, a new "scramble for Africa" has taken place. There has been an increased Chinese energy presence in Europe's neighbourhood with several African countries. For its part, China has been fostering strategic partnerships with African countries rich in oil and mineral resources. When the European Union Energy Security Strategy was launched in 2006, African countries instantly became the EU’s top strategic targets within the context of the European Commission’s “Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood” initiative and its “Energy Dialogue” with extra-European supplier, China and the EU, the world’s two largest oil importers, increasingly compete for access to the same hydrocarbons. Given that Europe imports the vast majority of its hydrocarbons from West Africa, the regional implications of China’s new gas sector in the Niger Delta should be a matter of concern. Democratically-backed and economically better monitored EU investments would make a difference compared to hitherto destructive Nigerian experiences, and local lobbying by EU member states and their numerous corporations could better voice community grievances than Beijing’s current silence on Chinese oil corporations heavily involved in environmentally harmful oil extraction methods. More generally, in the longer term, given that large-scale hydrocarbons extraction will take place on the dry western side of the continent in the near future, the increased European energy presence in Nigeria or Angola is seen by some ONGs as a tool for the prevention of deadly skirmishes over occupied regions and populations, possibly between the US and Chinese oil industries.

4. Conclusion

Referencing the observations and research of a range of informed scholars, as well as a growing number of more thinly researched sources and recent journalism, this text considers various dimensions and perceptions of Chinese economic engagement in Africa. Drawing on different disciplinary perspectives, scholars establishing strong cases focusing on the effects of Chinese enterprises and projects on human living standards and human rights, the environment, and governance. Broadly speaking, this body of literature falls into the enthusiastic, impatient, and critical schools of thought, often acknowledging the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese engagement simultaneously, treating scholars as well as political leaders. In support of this, the literature suggests that African governments and sub-state actors tend to push back against refined prescriptions, negotiate from a variety of perspectives, focus on development as well as democratic state practices, and emphasize negotiating tactics that help build economic state capacity. It is also argued in this text that scholars would benefit by further expanding investigations of Chinese engagement to include bilateral military activities, the social and environmental impact of Chinese investment beyond demand-responding environmental diplomacy, and the impact of China’s long history and other resources. This, together with several suggestions, may help to further broaden the range and enrich the depth of knowledge on this burgeoning international relationship.

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